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1. Introduction
This paper examines how the emergence of new social risks is translated into
new social policies in advanced industrialized democracies. New social risks result
from postindustrialization, and the shift from the industrial economy toward the
postindustrial service economy requires modern welfare states to respond to new social
needs and demands, such as for childcare infrastructure, elderly care services, social
protection against precarious employment, and individual security against unstable
household structures. Focusing on public childcare policy from among new social risk
policies, this paper explores the following two questions. First, does party politics
matter to the development of childcare services? Second, if it matters, along what
lines political parties compete with each other on this policy issue? Is it contended
along the traditional left–right dimension? Is it debated in a multi-dimensional policy
space?
This paper claims that childcare policy is now contended in a two-dimensional
policy space because current party systems have been transformed into a
two-dimensional system—where a redistributive axis and a social-value axis cross each
other—in modern democracies. As most advanced democracies have been required to
adapt to postindustrialization, childcare policy has become a more important part of
labor market policy in recent decades. However, political parties have different
preferences with regard to childcare policy according to their position in the
two-dimensional party competition space. Left–libertarian parties, supported by newly
emerging service and professional workers, seek to enhance female workers’
employability without sacrificing equality. Public childcare services are an
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indispensable policy tool to help young citizens reconcile career development and
family life and boost the labor supply of young, well-educated women (activation).
Left–authoritarian parties, rallying traditional blue-collar workers, prioritize the
protection of male industrial workers and seek to establish a labor market for service
employees apart from the core workers. Left–authoritarian parties prefer to see female
citizens working part time after a career hiatus related to childrearing, because working
part time with limited compensation does not threaten the traditional
male-breadwinner/female-caregiver family model (dualism). Right–libertarian parties
prefer to increase labor force participation by penalizing inactivity. These parties have
an incentive to develop childcare services, but it can fulfill this purpose by deregulating
these services and encouraging an inflow of cheap, flexible workers to them (workfare).
Right–authoritarian parties prefer either dualism or workfare, depending on the
configuration of their core constituencies. Because of these diverse preferences with
regard to employment policy across political parties, government composition facilitates
or obstructs the expansion of public subsidies for childcare services.
To examine the validity of the above argument, this paper constructs a new
dataset measuring each government’s policy position and policy distance between
coalition partners along the social-value (“libertarian–authoritarian”) dimension as well
as the redistributive (“left–right”) dimension; this is achieved by using Comparative
Manifesto Project’s (CMP) data.1 Then, by analyzing the data from 1980 until 2005 in
18 OECD countries with multivariate regression methods, this paper explores how
political parties’ policy positions affect the changes in public expenditure for childcare
programs.
1 Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, and Tanenbaum 2001; Klingemann, Volkens,
Bara, and Budge 2006; Volkens, Lacewell, Regel, Schultze, and Werner 2009.
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2010-002
3
This paper is organized into several sections. First, it explains what “new
social risks” refer to and the strategic location of childcare policy in economic policy
among advanced democracies; second, it shows the theoretical connection between the
realignment of party systems and partisan differences on childcare policy in a
multi-dimensional party competition space; third, it clarifies how this study constructs
the dataset of government policy positions and policy distance, and it describes other
variables used in regression models; fourth, it explains quantitative methods analyzing
the pooled time-series and cross-section data of this study; fifth, it presents the results of
regression analysis; finally, it summarizes the entire argument and discusses its
implications for literature on comparative politics.
2. Childcare as Economic Policy
New social risks are now becoming the subject of important research in the
study of comparative social policy literature.2 New social risks are defined as “the
risks that people now face in the course of their lives as a result of the economic and
social changes associated with the transition to a postindustrial society.”3 To
understand the “newness” of postindustrial social risks, it is useful to compare them
with “old” industrial social risks. Old social risks refer to the risks of wage earners
being unable to obtain an income in the labor market due to occupational injury,
sickness, incapacity, unemployment, old age, and so on. During the industrial period,
since the male-breadwinner/female-caregiver family model was prevalent in society,
welfare programs concentrated on male breadwinners. The main role of welfare states
2 See Armingeon and Bonoli 2006; Bonoli 2005, 2007; Esping-Andersen 1999, 2002;
Häusermann 2006; Taylor-Gooby 2004b.
3 Taylor-Gooby 2004a, 3.
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was to protect—mainly male—citizens by “decommodifying” them through cash
benefit programs.4 In other words, it was male breadwinners that industrial welfare
states insured against the volatility of the labor market during the post-war growth
period.
New social risks are those risks emerging due to the demise of male-dominant
labor markets, the emergence of the service economy, and the erosion of stable family
structures. With the spread of postindustrialization creating labor demands for service
workers, an increasingly large female labor force has been participating in the labor
market. The feminization of the labor force makes invalid the standard family model
that imposes the burden of child and elderly care on females in a household; it also
creates new social needs and demands for support to the reconciliation between paid
work in the labor market and unpaid care work in households. In a phenomenon not
unrelated to the transformation of labor markets, the increase in divorces and
single-parent households makes a nuclear family less dependable as a unit of social
protection than it was in the past. Working women, especially single mothers, cannot
reconcile their career with family burdens unless they can outsource caregiving in the
market and/or to public programs. In addition, together with the massive entry of
women into the labor market, the tertiarization of employment accompanies the increase
in low-paying, atypical service jobs. While low-skilled workers used to be able to find
relatively well-paid manual jobs because of the post-war economic growth, they now, in
the postindustrial era, face a different dilemma: that between becoming members of the
so-called “working poor” class and being in long-term unemployment. In sum, new
social risks refer to those risks that cannot be insured against under standard cash
4 Esping-Andersen 1985, 1990.
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benefits for male breadwinners, such as the inability to reconcile paid work and care
work, poverty among single parents, and precarious employment and/or long-term
unemployment among low-skilled workers.
Childcare policy is a typical example of new social risk policy. It aims to
“recommodify” citizens rather than “decommodify” them.5 Childcare services protect
young mothers and their children from the deficiency of social care, help those female
workers reconcile career development and family life, and then integrate them into the
labor market. Since the decline of gender inequality in educational opportunities and
the increasing labor demands for service sector jobs lessen the comparative advantages
of male workers in postindustrial society, childcare services can upgrade the skill
configuration of the national economy by minimizing the career hiatus of well-educated
female workers. In this sense, for modern governments in knowledge-based
economies, a childcare policy is composes a part of human capital formation strategy.
In fact, current policy papers assign economic efficiency rather than emancipation from
the male-breadwinner/female-caregiver family model to developed childcare services in
Europe.6
This paper takes childcare policy as a representative example of new social risk
policies and examines partisan effects on the changes in public spending for childcare
services in recent decades. While existing literature points out that path-dependent
effects established at the turn of the twentieth century or during the golden age of
welfare state development generally account for cross-national variations of new social
risk policies,7 and particularly childcare services,8 this study focuses on current
5 Taylor-Gooby 2004a.
6 Esping-Andersen 2002, 2009; Rodrigues 2003.
7 Bonoli 2007; Van Kersbergen and Manow 2009.
8 Bonoli and Reber 2010; Morgan 2006.
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government policy responses to the emergence of the service economy and the
increasing labor demands for female workers in recent decades.9 The policy context
surrounding childcare services has changed, and, as the European Union prescribed in
the Lisbon Strategy, the significance of such childcare services as a policy tool to
activate young female citizens is being increasingly recognized across advanced
industrialized countries. There is no doubt that the recent expansion of childcare
services has been a part of the modern state’s functional response to
postindustrialization. Is there any room for the influence of political partisanship in
this policy area?
In the “politics matters” camp, the power resources theory is used for explaining
the variations in public childcare policy across countries.10 However, its logic—which
accounts for the variation in welfare states in general—cannot be applied
straightforwardly to childcare policy. Although the proponents of this approach
theorize the development of welfare programs as a part of social democratic parties’
strategy for “decommodify” industrial workers and generating class solidarity among
the working class,11 public childcare programs “commodify” young female citizens.
There is no obvious reason that the labor movement or social democratic parties prefer
to encourage women to enter the labor market and heighten the wage competition
among workers. The power resources theory’s causal model for explaining variations
9 Bonoli and Reber 2010 claim that their statistical analysis examines recent
time-series changes, as well as cross-national variations, in public childcare
expenditures by using pooled time-series and cross-national data. However, they pool
the data of 16 OECD countries for just six years (1998–2003) and analyze it without a
lagged dependent variable or country dummies. Hence, it seems reasonable to say that
their econometric models account for the cross-national variations crystallized during
the 1960s and the1970s rather than recent changes in public childcare programs under
the postindustrial economy.
10 Esping-Andersen 1999; Huber and Stephens 2000; Iversen and Stephens 2008.
11 Esping-Andersen 1985; Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1984; Korpi 1983.
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2010-002
7
in the decommodification policy is inapplicable to the recommodification policy.
Feminist welfare state scholars criticize the power resources approach because
of its theoretical incapacity to take the recommodifying aspects of social policy into its
framework: they propose incorporating (de-)gendering effects of welfare states into
welfare/gender regime typologies.12 However, feminist welfare state scholars do not
present any solid causal models to explain cross-national variations and time-series
changes in gender-related welfare programs, many of which can be categorized as new
social risk policy in the context of this paper.
Furthermore, there is a justified rationale for expecting leftist parties to care less
about the expansion of affordable childcare services than about other welfare programs.
Rueda argues that “social democratic parties have strong incentives to consider insiders
their core constituency.”13 That is, while social democratic parties have incentives to
protect industrial workers as their constituency (insiders), these parties are less
enthusiastic about promoting the interests of precarious workers (outsiders). Since
many female employees are working as part-time or contract workers in public and
private sectors, Rueda’s work implies that government partisanship would have no
effects on public childcare provision.14
This paper challenges these assertions—the power resources approach’s
exclusive attention to left–right struggles and the insider–outsider approach’s
indifference to partisan differences—by examining the transformation of party systems
in modern democracies and its implications for childcare policy.
12 See, for example, Lewis 1992, 1997; O'Connor 1993; Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1994,
1996.
13 Rueda 2005, 62.
14 Rueda 2005, 2006.
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3. Postindustrial Party Competition and Childcare
Policy
This paper contends that party competition along a class cleavage and a
newly-emerging social-value cleavage determines childcare policy in postindustrial
society. Although left–right politics has been losing its influence on conventional
welfare programs in mature welfare states,15 partisan differences along the
redistributive dimension still have an impact on each government’s human capital
investment strategies under postindustrialization and global competition.16 While
leftist parties prefer to employ the public sector to upgrade national skill profiles and
increase the productivity of labor, rightist parties leave physical and human capital
investment to the private sector. Since childcare policy in the postindustrial society is
becoming a policy tool to integrate young mothers into the labor market and prevent
their marketable skills from deteriorating, childcare policy reflects government
partisanship along the redistributive dimension. That is, while leftist parties work for
the provision of childcare services, rightist parties prefer to leave it to the market.
However, childcare policy is debated along the social-value cleavage as well, because it
concerns life-style choices and family values. As Inglehart, Kitschelt, and others point
out, “new politics,” such as environmental protection, fulfillment of individual liberty,
feminism, and multiculturalism, appear in the politics of advanced democracies, and
reactions to rapid changes of social values then also emerge as political issues in those
countries.17 The contention over issues of values transforms party systems from
uni-dimensional to multi-dimensional ones. Since childcare services can promote the
15 For example, Pierson 1994, 1996; Ross 2000.
16 Boix 1997, 1998; Iversen and Stephens 2008.
17 Inglehart 1977, 1997 Kitschelt 1994, 1997.
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demise of traditional gender role models (male breadwinners/female care givers),
partisan differences along the social-value dimension influence a government’s policy
choices with regard to childcare. Overall, the conventional left–right politics along the
redistributive dimension interact with the new politics along the social-value dimension
and then affect childcare policy.
As pointed out in the previous section, childcare policy is now a part of human
capital investment policy in postindustrial democracies and therefore reflects partisan
confrontation on economic policy between left and right parties. Boix maintains that
leftist and rightist parties have different priorities on their platforms and employ distinct
supply-side economic policies to maximize growth and reduce unemployment under
global competition.18 That is, while left governments, concerned with achieving
equality as well as growth, increase public spending on human capital formation to
enhance national competitiveness, right governments, prioritizing growth over equality,
seek to create an incentive structure to encourage private investment and labor supply
by cutting taxes and lowering social wages. If Boix’s argument is correct, partisan
differences along the redistributive “left–right” dimension lead to distinctive childcare
policy even though both political camps prefer to prevent the deterioration of young
female workers’ skill profiles. Leftist governments increase their involvement in the
provision of childcare services in order to adapt their national economies to
postindustrialization without sacrificing equality. By contrast, rightist governments,
trying to achieve economic growth as well, deregulate childcare services and fulfill
social demands for those services by encouraging the inflow of cheap and flexible
workers to those services.
18 Boix 1997, 1998.
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However, political confrontation in the social-value dimension complicates the
politics of childcare policy in the postindustrial society. Many political scientists point
out that political competition in advanced industrialized countries has shifted from a
uni-dimensional, left-versus-right system toward a multi-dimensional one.19 Even
those who claim political parties are still structured in a single “left–right” dimension in
post-industrialized countries willingly admit that the current “left–right” axis puts less
weight on economic redistributive issues and incorporates cultural issues, such as
ecology, feminism, Europeanization, and immigration, instead.20 Among these
political scientists, Kitschelt accurately summarizes the transformation of party systems
in advanced democracies.21 He claims that party systems have been realigned along
the libertarian–authoritarian axis as well as the traditional left–right axis in recent
decades. The new division of work associated with postindustrialization has been
causing this transformation. While the conflicts between employees and employers in
the manufacturing sector generated the basic structure of Western European party
systems in the industrial era, the emergence of symbol- and client-processing service
workers with higher education makes the post-materialistic values in political
competition pivotal in the postindustrial era. Low-skilled manufacturing workers and
the old middle-class (e.g., the self-employed and farmers) react to the rise of these
post-materialistic values and put conservation of traditional values on political agendas.
As a result, according to Kitschelt, libertarian-versus-authoritarian politics becomes
salient in the party competition space in postindustrial societies.22
19 Betz and Immerfall 1998; Bornschier 2010; Flanagan and Lee 2003; Inglehart 1977,
1984; Kitschelt 1994, 1997; Kriesi 1998; Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier,
and Frey 2006, 2008.
20 Huber and Inglehart 1995; Lachat 2009; Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009.
21 Kitschelt 1994.
22 Kitschelt 1994.
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The social-value position of each political party is a significant determinant of
its policy preferences with regard to public and private childcare services performed
outside of households. First, the demography that is likely to need childcare services
overlaps the constituents with libertarian values. Female-ness itself does not indicate
an inclination to be libertarian.23 However, women have taken a large proportion of
symbol- and client-processing service jobs during the process of postindustrialization,
and these young women working in the private and public service sectors are likely to
overlap with those who more probably require childcare services. Second, libertarian
values are much more supportive to outsourcing unpaid care work to paid care services
than authoritarian values are. For instance, Flanagan and Lee’s empirical study, which
analyzes the data of the World Value Survey from twelve advanced democracies, shows
that libertarians are much stronger supporters of women’s rights than authoritarians.24
While libertarians believe that having a paid job is important for women’s independence
and self-fulfillment, authoritarians are attached to a conventional
male-breadwinner/female-caregiver gender model.
Due to these confrontations in the social-value dimension, we cannot presuppose
that, in current advanced democracies, political parties’ policy position on the
redistributive left–right axis predicts their policy preferences for childcare services.
The politics of childcare should be contemplated in at least the two-dimensional policy
space. As Figure 1 indicates, this paper maintains that political parties, depending on
their policy position in the two-dimensional policy space, can employ three different
strategies for female employment and childcare issues. Left–libertarian parties,
supported by newly emerging service and professional workers, seek activation. Since
23 In many Western European countries, women were more likely to vote for the
Christian Democratic party than men.
24 Flanagan and Lee 2003, 253-256.
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their goal is to enhance female workers’ employability without sacrificing equality, they
prefer to make the public sector actively step in for the provision of various services.
For these parties, public childcare services are an important policy tool to help young
citizens reconcile career development and family life and boost the labor supply of
young, well-educated women.
Right–libertarian parties take workfare strategies. These parties encourage
female labor force participation and adapt the national economy to postindustrialization
without expanding the role of the public sector. Although right–libertarian parties also
prefer to prevent female workers from exiting the labor market, they try to achieve this
policy goal without involving the public sector. Aside from improving public
childcare service provisions, a national economy can fulfill the demand for childcare
services by deregulating them and encouraging an inflow of cheap, flexible workers to
them.25 Because childcare services are extremely labor-intensive, middle-class
mothers cannot purchase these services from the market unless wage inequality is quite
large and these services employ low-wage, low-skilled workers in the national economy.
To put it the other way around, the market can fulfill the demand for childcare services
if a government can sacrifice income equality. In fact, Bonoli and Reber’s regression
analysis shows that wage inequality is highly correlated with the coverage of childcare
services among babies under three years old in 16 OECD countries.26
Right–libertarian parties have an incentive to encourage female labor force participation,
but they achieve this purpose by penalizing inactivity in single mothers and
deregulating childcare services.
25 Bonoli and Reber 2010; Morgan 2005
26 Bonoli and Reber 2010, 106-107.
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2010-002
13
Figure 1. Partisan Differences on Two-Dimensional Policy Space
Left–authoritarian parties, rallying traditional blue-collar workers, opt for
dualism. They prioritize the protection of male industrial workers and seek to
establish a flexible labor market for service sector employees other than the core
workers. Such parties prefer to see female citizens working part time after a career
hiatus for childrearing because working part time with limited compensation does not
threaten the traditional male-breadwinner/female-caregiver family model. Although
dualism generates a huge wage inequality between protected and precarious employees,
it can preserve traditional family values and social harmony as long as these precarious
workers are maintained by male breadwinners.
Right–authoritarian parties prefer either dualism or workfare, depending on the
configuration of their core constituencies. If right–authoritarian parties try to please
Right
Workfare
Left
Authoritarian
Libertarian
Dualism
Dualism
Activation Workfare
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2010-002
14
the capitalist and management class, they adopt the workfare strategy. On the other
hand, if they cajole traditionalist blue-collar workers and the old middle-class into
voting for them, they espouse dualism. Either way, right–authoritarian parties look
unfavorably on the expansion of public childcare services.
The argument presented above—political parties adopt different strategies for
childcare according to their policy position in the two-dimensional party competition
space—leads to two hypotheses. First, if partisan differences do matter to childcare
policy, the government policy position, composed of coalition parties’ policy
preferences, does also have an influence on public childcare policy. Specifically, the
expansion of government spending and subsidies for childcare services requires a “left”
and “libertarian” government in the two-dimensional policy space. Second, if political
parties’ policy preferences for childcare affect government childcare policy,
heterogeneity of policy preferences among coalition partners in the two-dimensional
policy space also does matter. As Tsebelis and others argue, a wider range of policy
preferences among “veto players” limits the possible policy changes from the status
quo.27 Since expanding the public sector’s role in childcare is a change from the status
quo, the policy range among coalition partners in the left–right dimension and the
libertarian–authoritarian dimension should affect changes with regard to public
childcare policy. In other words, the greater the heterogeneity of the policy
preferences among veto players, the slower the growth in public spending for childcare
services in the postindustrial society. In later sections, this paper tests these two
hypotheses with empirical data.
27 Tsebelis 1999, 2002; Tsebelis and Chang 2004.
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2010-002
15
4. Data
This section describes the data and the variables used in the regression models.
This study analyzes data on 18 advanced industrialized countries from 1980 to 2005.28
Its dependent variable is annual changes in public spending for childcare services as a
percentage of GDP. Since this study is interested in the effects of partisan differences
on a government’s welfare efforts for childcare services, it takes time-series changes of
aggregate expenditure levels for childcare as its dependent variable. As previous
research suggests, recipients of public childcare services and subsidies do not seek
public spending per se.29 Aggregate expenditure levels do not express how spending
is distributed among those who need childcare services. However, this study’s interest
is in determining whether political factors motivate welfare states to allocate scarce
resources to public childcare services. Hence, its use of an aggregate spending level as
an approximation of welfare efforts is justifiable.
The data for the dependent variable comes from the OECD Social Expenditure
Database (SOCX).30 It consists of in-kind expenditure for daycare centres, home help
services, and others. OECD changes its definition of “in-kind benefits for family” and
adds pre-primary education expenditures to this category for the data in 1998 and later.
As Figure 2—which shows time trends for public spending on in-kind benefits for
family as a percentage of GDP in 18 countries—clearly indicates, this definitional
change creates a huge break in data for several countries, such as Belgium, France, and
Italy. To absorb these effects and make time-series comparison possible, this study
28 These 18 countries are composed of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.
29 See Allan and Scruggs 2004; Esping-Andersen 1990.
30 OECD 2009e.
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creates a period dummy (i.e., 1 in 1998; otherwise 0) for each country, and puts these 18
dummy variables into regression models.
Figure 2. Public Spending for Childcare Services as % of GDP in 18 OECD
Countries, 1980-2005.
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To test the influences of party competition along the social-value dimension as
well as the redistributive dimension, this paper constructs a New Veto Players Dataset:
1960–2005. This is essentially an extended and updated version of Tsebelis’s Veto
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Players Dataset with the newest data on government composition.31 While Tsebelis’s
dataset does not consider the social-value dimension, does not cover Italian and
Japanese data after their respective party system transformations in the mid 1990s, and
ends in 1999, this study’s dataset covers the social libertarian–authoritarian dimension
as well as the economic left–right dimension by using Comparative Manifestos Project’s
(CMP) data32 and extend the time periods until 2005 with the data from European
Journal of Political Research (various issues).
This dataset locates each political party’s policy position both in the economic
left–right and the social libertarian–authoritarian dimensions with CMP’s data. To
measure political parties’ policy positions, political scientists have proposed two main
approaches: expert surveys and content analysis. Researchers employing expert
surveys send a questionnaire to political scientists in examined countries and ask them
to locate their countries’ political parties in several policy dimensions.33 While such
estimations of party policy positions are intuitive, this approach has several
considerable shortcomings. First, since expert surveys cannot be conducted
retrospectively, it is impossible to estimate the policy positions of those parties that
existed before the first expert survey was held in the late 1980s. Second, the data on
short-lived parties are missing because expert surveys are carried out once every five to
ten years. Third, it is extremely difficult to follow time-series changes in parties’
policy positions because expert surveys are conducted sporadically. On the other hand,
content analysis analyzes party manifestos and estimates party policy positions from
text data.34 Although content analysis of political text might have greater errors than
31 Tsebelis n.d.
32 Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2009.
33 Benoit and Laver 2006; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Laver and Hunt 1992.
34 Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Laver and Garry 2000.
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expert surveys,35 content analysis has advantages in terms of estimating time-series
changes in policy preferences of political parties, because political parties issue their
manifestos at the time of every election. Since this study analyzes annual changes in
public spending for childcare services, estimating time-series changes in party policy
positions is indispensable for its analysis. Hence, this study uses CMP’s data as a de
facto standard of content analysis approach.
To estimate each political party’s policy positions in the redistributive left–right
and the social-value libertarian–authoritarian dimensions, New Veto Players Dataset
generates two indicators: Economic Left–Right Policy Position and Social
Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position. CMP assigns each sentence in electoral
programs to one of 56 pre-determined categories and calculates the ratio of each
category in each electoral manifesto. Following McDonald and Mendes’s approach,
while this dataset attributes 13 categories to “Left” and 9 categories to “Right,” it
ascribes 5 categories to “Libertarian” and 5 to “Authoritarian” (see Table 1).36 An
Economic Left–Right Policy Position subtracts the score of “Left” categories from that
of “Right” categories (– = left; + = right) in each country and each election. In the
same way, a Social Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position subtracts the score of
“Libertarian” categories from that of “Authoritarian” categories (– = libertarian; + =
authoritarian) in each country and each election. This study assumes that political
parties maintain their policy position during the interval between elections, and it makes
the left–right and the libertarian–authoritarian scores annual data by this assumption.
Although separating the social–value dimension from the economic left–right
dimension makes no sense unless these two dimensions are orthogonal to each other, the
35 McDonald and Mendes 2001.
36 McDonald and Mendes 2001, 108-111.
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two-dimensional policy space appears conceptually and substantively valid, because the
correlation between Economic Left–Right Policy Position and Social
Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position is quite weak (Pearson’s r = 0.119 for all
parties, 1980–2005).
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Table 1. Subtractive Measures of Economic Left–Right and Social Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position
Note: Numbering corresponds to CMP.
Economic categories Social categories
Left Right Libertarian Authoritarian
302 Centralization: pro 301 Decentralization 602 National way of life: con 601 National way of life: pro
403 Market regulation 401 Free enterprise 604 Traditional morality: con 603 Traditional morality: pro
404 Economic planning 407 Protectionism: con 607 Multiculturalism: pro 608 Multiculturalism: con
405 Corporatism 410 Productivity 705 Minority groups: pro 605 Law and order
406 Protectionism: pro 411 Infrastructure 706 Non-economic groups 606 Social harmony
409 Keynesian economics 414 Economic orthodoxy
412 Controlled economy 505 Welfare: con
413 Nationalization 507 Education: con
415 Marxism 702 Labor groups: con
503 Social Justice
504 Welfare: pro
506 Education: pro
701 Labor groups: pro
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After each political party’s policy positions are located on the left–right as well
as the libertarian–authoritarian dimensions, each single-party or coalition government’s
policy positions in these two dimensions are estimated. The dataset uses, as the
measure of each government’s policy position, an average of each coalition party’s
policy position weighted by its share of seats in the lower house among governing
parties, calculated using the following equation:
where iP denotes a coalition party i’s policy position in either the left–right dimension
or the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, and iW indicates a coalition party i’s
decimal share of seats to the entire ruling coalition’s seats in the lower house. Based
on the data of each government’s policy position, I calculated the Government
Left–Right Policy Position and Government Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position.
These variables are the annual scores of government policy position in the redistributive
left–right and the social libertarian–authoritarian dimensions, respectively, weighted by
the duration of cabinets in each year.
To test the effects of veto players, New Veto Players Dataset also calculates
Left–Right Policy Range and Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Range. Previous
studies reveal that wider policy distance among coalition partners impedes the cabinet
from reforming its policies and creates a status-quo bias.38 As discussed in the
previous section, if childcare policy is contended along the social-value dimension as
38 Tsebelis 1999, 2002; Tsebelis and Chang 2004.
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well as the redistributive dimension, policy distance among veto players should be
measured in these dimensions and used for estimating effects on the changes in public
spending for childcare services. These two variables measure the policy distance
between the two most extreme parties among coalition partners in the left–right
dimension and the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, respectively. Furthermore, the
dataset also calculates General Policy Distance by measuring the distance among
coalition partners in the two-dimensional Euclidian space (see Figure 3). This was
done by taking the square root of the Left–Right Policy Range’s square and
Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Range’s square:
.
These three annual variables are also weighted by the duration of cabinets in each year.22
Party A
Party B
Party C
Left–Right Policy Range
Libertarian-Authoritarian
Policy
RangeGeneral Policy Distance
Figure 3. Example of policy distance in a three-party coalition government
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In addition, I put a Minority Dummy and Oversize Coalition Dummy into
regression models. While the policy distance between coalition partners is
underestimated when the coalition is a minority government or the president faces a
divided government, it is overestimated when the government is an oversized coalition.
These two dummy variables are intended to adjust for these effects. If the cabinet
coalition has a minority position in the lower house, the Minority Dummy takes one;
otherwise, it takes zero. If the cabinet coalition can maintain its majority status in the
lower house even when the smallest coalition partner leaves the cabinet, the Oversize
Coalition Dummy takes one; otherwise, it takes zero. Since these two variables are
also annualized by taking the average weighted with the duration of cabinets in each
year, the Minority Dummy and Oversize Coalition Dummy take a continuous value
between 0 and 1.
Since existing research emphasizes the impact of women’s economic and
political mobilization on public social services,39 this study puts % of Women in
Parliaments into the regression models.40 In addition, to control for the effects of
socio-demographic demands for childcare services, Population under 15 Years of Age 41
and % of Service Sector Employment 42 are put into the models. While the former
measures the percentage of the population under 15 years of age, the latter indicates
male and female employment in services as a percentage of total civilian employment.
Although the female labor force participation rate is the immediate candidate for
explaining social demands for public childcare expenditures, public spending on
childcare services itself is a part of government tactics to encourage women’s
39 Huber and Stephens 2000, 2006.
40 Armingeon, Leimgruber, Beyeler, and Menegale 2006; Inter-Parliamentary Union
2010.
41 OECD 2009d.
42 OECD 2000, 2009b.
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employment, and then putting it into regression models generates endogeneity. The
results of regression models replacing % of Service Sector Employment with Female
Labor Force Participation Rate 43 are shown in Appendix A.
Finally, Natural Logarithm of Purchasing Power Parity GDP per capita 44,
Growth Rate of Real GDP 45, and Consumer Price Index 46 are added to the regression
models to control the levels of economic development, business cycles, and inflation.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables.
43 OECD 2009a.
44 OECD 2009c.
45 IMF n.d..
46 IMF n.d..
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable N Min Mean Max b/w S.D. within S.D.Overall S.D.
Dependent Variables
Annual changes in public spending for
childcare services (% of GDP) 432 -0.405 0.017 0.693 0.089 0.015 0.088
Independent Variables
Natural log. of GDP per capita (PPP US$) 468 8.736 9.870 10.764 0.376 0.121 0.357
Growth rate of real GDP 468 -6.244 2.535 11.495 2.029 0.764 1.887
Consumer price index 468 -11.316 3.905 21.800 3.746 1.385 3.496
% of population under 15 years of age 468 13.700 19.349 30.400 2.921 2.571 1.508
% of service sector employment 468 47.800 65.740 78.600 6.786 5.174 4.551
% of female labor force participation 467 32.300 57.713 79.300 10.938 9.600 5.702
% of women in parliaments 468 1.400 18.622 45.300 11.703 10.202 6.201
Minority dummy 468 0.000 0.268 1.000 0.432 0.358 0.256
Oversize coalition dummy 468 0.000 0.240 1.000 0.414 0.343 0.246
Left–Right policy position 452 -0.381 -0.052 0.326 0.132 0.076 0.110
Left–Right policy range 452 0.000 0.127 0.650 0.135 0.100 0.094
Libertarian–Authoritarian policy position 452 -0.268 0.018 0.276 0.068 0.029 0.062
Libertarian–Authoritarian policy range 452 0.000 0.079 0.739 0.110 0.087 0.069
General policy distance 452 0.000 0.158 0.798 0.166 0.130 0.107
Note: S.D. = Standard Deviation.
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5. Method
Since the dataset is pooled time-series and cross-section (TSCS) data, following
a conventional method in comparative political economy, this study uses a
unit-fixed-effect model with panel-corrected standard errors in order to estimate the
effects of independent variables on a dependent variable.47 A unit-fixed-effect model
is a parameter estimation method putting unit dummies into regression. These unit
dummy variables perfectly absorb unobservable country-specific effects so that the
fixed effect models utilize only within-country variance of variables.48 Since the
fixed-effect models utilize only changes in dependent and independent variables in each
unit, this analytical method is robust to omitted-variable and sample-selection biases.
Although panel-corrected standard errors correct contemporaneous
heteroscedasticity across countries, the fixed-effect model still requires us to address
serial correlation of residuals. Since the main explanatory variables of this study—the
cabinet’s policy position and policy distance among coalition partners—are supposed to
affect the changes in public spending on childcare services rather than the level of the
spending, this study uses annual changes in the public spending as its dependent
variable and puts a lagged expenditure level into models in order to incorporate the
dynamics of the dependent variable.49 In addition, all independent variables except
47 Beck 2001; Beck and Katz 1995, 1996.
48 This is because fixed-effect models can be transformed into the following equation
(Plümper et al. 2005: 331):
)e-(e)x-(xy-y iti,ik,ti,k,kiti,  
, where y denotes a dependent variable, x the vector of constant and k independent
variables, e residuals, i a unit, and t a time period.
49 This study’s models can be summarized in the following equation:
,
where Y indicates a dependent variable, X the vector of explanatory variables,
country dummies, error terms, i unit, t time period. This model can be easily
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macroeconomic indicators are one-year lagged, because a typical budgeting process
occurs in the year previous to the current fiscal year and political factors influence the
budgeting politics in the previous year.
6. Results
reformulated into a well-known lagged-dependent variable model:
. See Beck and
Katz 1996; Iversen and Cusack 2000.
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Table 2. Regression of Annual Changes in Public Spending for Childcare Services
on Explanatory Variables in 18 OECD Countries, 1980–2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public Spending for Family Services (t-1) -0.088 -0.080 -0.090 -0.088
(0.024)** (0.025)** (0.024)** (0.023)**
Natural Log of GDP per capita (PPP ) 0.005 0.019 0.001 -0.009
(0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Real GDP Growth Rate -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.002)+ (0.002)+ (0.002)+ (0.002)
Consumer Price Index 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% of Population under 15 Years of Age (t-1) -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.010
(0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)**
% of Service Employment (t-1) 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
% of Women in Parliaments (t-1) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)+ (0.001) (0.001)
Minority Government Dummy (t-1) 0.031 0.033 0.033 0.034
(0.012)* (0.013)* (0.012)** (0.012)**
Oversize Government Dummy (t-1) -0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.002
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Left–Right Policy Position (t-1) -0.115 - -0.117 -0.128
(0.034)** - (0.034)** (0.034)**
Left–Right Policy Range (t-1) -0.058 - - -
(0.030)* - - -
Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position (t-1) - 0.004 0.042 0.112
- (0.051) (0.049) (0.052)*
Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Range (t-1) - -0.064 - -
- (0.039) - -
Left–Right Policy Position (t-1) X - - - 0.601
Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position (t-1) - - - (0.300)*
General Policy Distance in the Two- - - -0.052 -0.050
Dimensional Policy Space (t-1) - - (0.027)+ (0.027)+
Constant 0.148 0.095 0.209 0.308
(0.238) (0.236) (0.244) (0.255)
Observations 421 421 421 421
Countries 18 18 18 18
0.605 0.589 0.605 0.608
Model FE FE FE FE
Note:
1. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% (two-tailed tests).
2. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
3. FE = fixed-effect model.
4. The coefficients and standard errors of country dummies and period dummies for
year 1998 are not shown to save space.
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Table 2 presents the results of multivariate regression models analyzing the
effects of explanatory variables on the annual changes in public spending for childcare
services. Among socio-economic factors, first, per capita GDP and the percentage of
service sector employment do not show statistically significant effects on the dependent
variable. Although modernization without doubt results in individual prosperity and
the tertiarization and feminization of employment and leads to a growing demand for
childcare services, the levels of material affluence and tertiarization do not necessarily
induce a government to immediately raise its involvement in childcare services. It
seems that some other factors intervene between postindustrialization and public
spending on childcare services. Second, as is expected, the percentage of female labor
force participation increases public expenditures for childcare services (see Appendix A).
However, as discussed above, the percentage of female labor force participation is
endogenous to the dependent variable, and therefore it must be carefully regarded as
causal effects. Third, contrary to this study’s expectations, the percentage of
population under 15 years of age consistently indicates its negative effects in all models.
Welfare states currently respond to declining birthrate and number of children by
increasing their efforts for childcare services.
The interpretation of political variables requires cautious consideration.
Models 1 to 3 appear to show that the redistributive dimension is more dominant than
the social-value dimension in public childcare policy. Model 1 includes only
Government Left–Right Policy Position and Government Left–Right Policy Range in its
equation, from among party policy variables. While Government Left–Right Policy
Position shows negative effects on the dependent variable with statistical significance,
Government Left–Right Policy Range also indicates negative effects. This result
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suggests that the shift in government policy position toward the left (i.e., negative)
actually increases public spending on childcare services, while distant policy
preferences among coalition partners in the left–right dimension impede it. Similarly,
Model 2 puts only Government Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position and
Government Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Range into its equation, from among
party policy variables. Both variables do not show statistically significant effects.
While Model 3 includes Government Left–Right Policy Position, Government
Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position, and General Policy Distance in the
regression equation, just the left–right position and policy distance indicate statistically
significant effects on the dependent variable.
However, this paper’s theoretical section claimed that the expansion of public
childcare expenditure requires a “left” and “libertarian” government in the
two-dimensional policy space: therefore, it follows that a government policy position in
the left–right dimension should interact with that in the libertarian–authoritarian
dimension. To test the interaction effects, Model 4 puts an interaction term between
Government Left–Right Policy Position and Government Libertarian–Authoritarian
Policy Position into its equation. Since interaction effects cannot be interpreted based
on only a regression table,50 the interaction effects between these two variables are
calculated by using Model 4’s variance-covariance matrix and presented in Figure 4.
This figure clearly demonstrates that the effects of a government’s left–right policy
position on the dependent variable rely on its libertarian–authoritarian policy position.
As long as a government’s policy position is located on the libertarian side (i.e.,
negative on the horizontal axis), the coefficient of the Government Left–Right Policy
50 Kam and Franzese 2007.
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Position remains negative, which means that a left government increases public
spending for childcare services. But the coefficient of the Government Left–Right
Policy Position becomes statistically indistinguishable from 0 when the Government
Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position approaches 0.1. A left–authoritarian
government has no positive effects on the dependent variable. This result matches this
paper’s theoretical expectations.
Figure 4. Estimated Interaction Effects between Government Left–Right Policy
Position and Government Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position in Model A4
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Furthermore, the effects of party policy variables are substantive. For
instance, when a government shifts its policy position toward the left and the libertarian
side by one standard deviation respectively (i.e., -0.132 in the left–right dimension and
-0.068 in the libertarian–authoritarian dimension), Model 4 predicts that the policy shift
will increase public spending on childcare services by 0.015% of GDP, ceteris
paribus.51 Although the absolute value seems tiny because the scale of the dependent
variable is small, this value is equivalent to 16.5% of the dependent variable’s standard
deviation. The same directional policy shift by two standard deviations is expected to
raise the dependent variable by 0.040% of GDP, which is equivalent to 45.1% of its
standard deviation, holding other things constant. Similarly, one standard deviation
increase of General Policy Distance (= 0.166) is estimated to decrease public spending
on childcare services by 0.008% of GDP in Model 4, which is equal to 9.3% of one
standard deviation of the dependent variable. The results of this study’s regression
analysis suggest that a government’s policy position and policy distance among
coalition partners in the two-dimensional policy space influence its decision to expand
or reduce the public sector’s role in childcare.
7. Conclusion
This paper took childcare policy as a representative example of new social risk
policies and explored whether partisan differences have had an impact on the recent
expansion of public childcare expenditure. It argued that political parties contend with
each other over human capital investment strategies and female labor force participation
51 This can be calculated by –0.128×left–right policy position + 0.112×
libertarian–authoritarian policy position + 0.601×left–right policy position×
libertarian–authoritarian policy position.
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in the social-value dimension as well as the redistributive dimension, and that each
political party has different policy preferences and strategies for women’s employment
and childcare policy according to its position in the two-dimensional party competition
space. That is, a left–libertarian party prefers activation, a left–authoritarian party
dualism, a right–libertarian party workfare, and a right–authoritarian party dualism or
workfare. From among these strategies, only activation is favorable to the expansion
of public childcare expenditures. Assuming that different party policies have a distinct
impact on public childcare policy, this paper hypothesized that a government policy
position composed of governing parties’ policy positions and the policy distance
between them in the two-dimensional policy space affect the changes in public spending
for childcare services. By analyzing the pooled time-series and cross-section data of
18 OECD countries from 1980 until 2005 using multivariate regression methods, this
paper revealed that a government’s left–right policy position interacts with its
libertarian–authoritarian policy position, and that a left–libertarian government raises its
budget for childcare services while a left–authoritarian government does not. In
addition, this paper also demonstrated that a wider policy distance between veto players
in the two-dimensional policy space impedes the expansion of public spending for
childcare services.
This paper has several implications for the literature of comparative politics.
First, this study reveals that the politics of new social risks and welfare state
restructuring is structured, not by a uni-dimensional left–right policy space, but by a
multi-dimensional party competition space in postindustrial democracies. While a
number of party system researchers have discussed the emergence of the social-value
cleavage and its impact on party systems in Western European countries since
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Inglehart’s seminal work,52 few scholars have explored the effects of the party system
transformation on public policy in the welfare state literature.53 This study creates a
new dataset measuring each political party’s policy position not just in the redistributive
dimension but also in the social-value dimension and empirically demonstrates that
political competition over childcare policy is conducted in the two-dimensional policy
space. This study’s empirical approach and results defy the conventional “left–right”
perspective in welfare state research.
Second, this paper exemplifies the idea that social democratic parties need to
be differentiated according to their policy position in the libertarian–authoritarian
dimension. While Rueda argues that current social democratic parties are owned by
the interests of protected workers,54 this study suggests that whether a leftist party
defends less-protected workers depends on its policy position in the social-value
dimension. This paper’s empirical results show that although a government’s “left”
position does not necessarily help female employees to reconcile their paid work and
unpaid care work, a “left–libertarian” government serves beneficial public goods to
young female workers, at least, in the area of childcare. This paper’s
multi-dimensional approach can deepen the understanding of insider-outsider politics as
well.
Finally, this study demonstrates that the logic of representative democracy is
still working in the politics of new social risk policies. Postindustrialization led to the
tertiarization and feminization of the labor market and generated a new social-value
cleavage in industrialized countries. Political parties are now rallying those voters
52 Inglehart 1977.
53 Häusermann’s works are exceptional in this respect. See Häusermann 2006, 2010a,
2010b.
54 Rueda 2005, 2006.
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diversified in the multi-dimensional policy space with public policy. Although it has
been pointed out that economic “left” and “right” parties are approaching each other
around the politics of conventional welfare programs such as pensions,55 this paper
illuminates that partisan differences along the redistributive dimension as well as the
social-value dimension have an impact on the politics of childcare policy. Constituents
with diversified preferences choose their representative parties through elections, a
government composed of those political parties makes its childcare policy by reflecting
the constituents’ preferences, and then the government enforces the policy. Childcare
policy is a product of postindustrial party competition.
55 See, for instance, Kitschelt 1994; Pierson 1994, 1996; Ross 2000. However, some
scholars argue that partisan differences on the redistributive dimension still influence
cash benefit programs significantly. See Allan and Scruggs 2004; Korpi and Palme 2003.
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Appendix A. Regression of Annual Changes of Public Spending for Childcare
Services on Explanatory Variables in 18 OECD Countries, 1980–2005, with Female
Labor Force Participation Rates
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4)
Public Spending for Family Services (t-1) -0.094 -0.092 -0.095 -0.093
(0.024)** (0.025)** (0.024)** (0.024)**
Natural Log of GDP per capita (PPP ) -0.010 -0.018 -0.015 -0.021
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Real GDP Growth Rate -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Consumer Price Index 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% of Population under 15 Years Old (t-1) -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 -0.008
(0.002)** (0.002)* (0.002)** (0.003)**
% of Female Labor Force Participation (t-1) 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.001)* (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)*
% of Women in Parliaments (t-1) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Minority Government Dummy (t-1) 0.029 0.032 0.030 0.031
(0.013)* (0.014)* (0.013)* (0.013)*
Oversize Government Dummy (t-1) -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 0.000
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Left–Right Policy Position (t-1) -0.102 - -0.102 -0.112
(0.033)** - (0.033)** (0.034)**
Left–Right Policy Range (t-1) -0.057 - - -
(0.031)+ - - -
Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position (t-1) - -0.002 0.029 0.090
- (0.049) (0.046) (0.051)+
Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Range (t-1) - -0.089 - -
- (0.039)* - -
Left–Right Policy Position (t-1) X - - - 0.516
Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position (t-1) - - - (0.297)+
General Policy Distance in the Two-Dimensional - - -0.058 -0.056
Policy Space (t-1) - - (0.027)* (0.027)*
Constant 0.128 0.120 0.180 0.264
(0.243) (0.236) (0.245) (0.258)
Observations 420 420 420 420
Countries 18 18 18 18
0.611 0.600 0.612 0.614
Model FE FE FE FE
Note:
1. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% (two-tailed tests).
2. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
3. FE = fixed-effect model.
4. The coefficients and standard errors of country and period dummies are not shown
for saving space.
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